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Vertical Federalism, the New States’ Rights,
and the Wisdom of Crowds
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The Doy & Dee Henley Chair and Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence, Chapman
University, Fowler School of Law.
1
E.g., COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, BOARD OF EDUCATION, STANDARDS OF LEARNING FOR
VIRGINIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 90 (1995); HEDLEY BEARE, CREATING THE FUTURE SCHOOL: STUDENT
OUTCOMES AND THE REFORM OF EDUCATION 78 (2001).
2
ISAAC NEWTON, PHILOSOPHIÆ NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (Andrew Mothe trans.,
1729) (1687).
3
JESSICA KORN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MYTH
OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 19 (1996); WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 54–56 (John Hopkins Univ. Press 1981) (1885). Wilson thought the framers created
an “unconscious copy of the Newtonian theory” of celestial mechanics. I would not be too quick to adopt
Wilson’s assumption.
4
Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008).
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When we think of the “separation of powers,” we usually think of the
three branches of the federal government. We all learn in grade school1 that
the framers, in an effort to protect the liberties of the people, created three
branches of the national government, each to serve as a check on the other.
We frequently compare this separation of powers to a three-layer cake,
although the framers were not thinking of bakers and the kitchen. If they had,
I suppose their metaphor would be a marble cake, because each of the
branches shares some powers with the others. Congress enacts the laws, but
the President can veto them, and the courts can invalidate them. The President
nominates the major offices including the judges, but the Senate need not
confirm them. The Executive Branch enforces the laws, but Judges interpret
them, and Congress, within broad bounds, can limit the jurisdiction of the
courts to review them.
The framers, however, were not thinking of three-layer cakes or marble
cakes. They were more likely thinking of The Principia,2 Sir Isaac Newton’s
book published a century earlier. The framers’ desire to separate power
mirrored, in part, their fascination with philosophical aspects of Newtonian
physics—for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.3
The three branches of government on the federal level—what we may
call horizontal separation of powers4—often makes it difficult for the
President to have his way, even when his party controls both Houses of
Congress. Horizontal separation does not create a more efficient
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government—dictatorships are efficient; democracies never are. However,
horizontal separation helps preserve the liberties that our Constitution grants.
The framers were concerned that the rights found in the Constitution were
mere statements—“parchment barriers”—that would not be enough to
protect the people from the abuse of power.5 Thus, they sought to control
power by separating it.
This separation of powers within the federal government is not the only
method the framers designed to preserve liberty. They also embraced another
form of Newtonian mechanics to balance power and thus preserve liberty—
what we may call vertical separation—using the states to check the power of
the federal government.6 The states, no less than the three branches on the
federal level, protect the liberty of the people by dividing power between the
federal and the state governments.
Vertical federalism protects our liberties and makes us the envy of the
world, first, because the states are an important counterbalance to the federal
government. The framers used power to limit power. Second, because when
the independent states go their independent ways they implement what the
economists call the “wisdom of crowds.”7
VERTICAL FEDERALISM AND THE LIMITS ON
FEDERAL COMMERCE AND SPENDING POWER

5

Thus, James Madison said in the The Federalist No. 48:

C M
Y K

06/27/2016 12:34:37

Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution
of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power?
This is the security which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of the
American constitutions. But experience assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly
overrated; and that some more adequate defence is indispensably necessary for the more feeble,
against the more powerful members of the government. The legislative department is every where
extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (emphasis added).
6
Brannon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, and Legal Obstacles to State
Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 567 (2015).
7
E.g., Sheng Kung Michael Yi, Mark Steyvers, Michael D. Lee & Matthew J. Dry, The Wisdom
of the Crowd in Combinatorial Problems, 36 COGNITIVE SCI. 452–70 (2012) (showing that aggregate
solutions outperform the majority of individual solutions. The wisdom of the crowd phenomenon is
applicable to problem-solving and decision-making situations that go beyond the estimation of single
numbers.).
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Look at any map of the United States and ask yourself, how many states
have a border where no side is a straight line. The answer, only one—Hawaii.
Our states are artificial constructs. The people of each of the states may speak
with different accents, share different histories, and embrace diverse cultures,
but they are not states in the sense of the modern nation-states of France,
Great Britain, or Germany. Nonetheless, they are more than merely dotted
lines on a map. They retain some reserved power that the federal government
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THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
E.g., Robin Gonzalez, When Did “The United States” Become a Singular Noun?, IO9 (July 27,
2013, 11:15 AM), http://io9.gizmodo.com/when-did-the-united-states-become-a-singular-noun-9497716
85.
10 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying
War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”) (emphasis added).
11 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Dred Scott After
Nearly Two Centuries, VERDICT (Oct. 26, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/10/26/dred-scott-afternearly-two-centuries.
12
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13 See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE chs. 14–16 (5th ed. 2012).
9
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cannot reach. Granted, the Court has steadily reduced this area of reserved
powers, but there is a core that still exists. These limits on the federal
government have made our country more powerful, not less, while protecting
our freedom. The rights of the states impose chains on the federal
government, and these chains make us free.
The term, “states’ rights” or “state sovereignty” became a code word of
racial segregation in the 1940s and 1950s, when Southern politicians used it
to justify “separate but equal.” We often forget that the original (and present)
purpose of “states’ right” is not to protect states, as incorporeal entities. The
purpose of states’ rights is to protect us, the people. James Madison wrote
that our system of federalism provides “a double security . . . to the rights of
the people.”8 The thirteen states then, and the fifty states now, are shields to
protect individual rights.
Before the Civil War, commentators typically referred to “These United
States.”9 The Constitution treats “The United States” as a plural noun.10
While “the United States” is now a singular noun, what is important is not
the customs of modern grammar but the fact that in this one nation composed
of many states, the states still have a reserved power that limits the
undeveloped appetite of the central government in self-restraint. That
reserved power protects our rights.
Until the Civil War, many of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
focused on making one nation out of the many states. In the early years, the
Court used the dormant commerce clause to create an economic common
market by invalidating many state laws that interfered with trade among the
states. From Dred Scott11 until Lochner v. New York,12 the Court was
relatively quiet. From Lochner until 1937, the Court was active in creating
economic rights that did not have a textual basis in the Constitution.
However, since the Court Packing Plan of 1937, the Court has almost
abdicated its role in the economy. Instead, it turned its focus to cases
expanding civil liberties.13 In recent years, it has imposed some limits on the
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14 See 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.10 (5th ed. 2012).
15
See id. at ch. 5.
16
See id. at chs. 6–8.
17
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
18
See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); see also the discussion in Ronald D. Rotunda,
King v. Burwell and the Rise of the Administrative State, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. REV. 267 (2015).
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power of Congress under the Commerce Clause14 and the Spending Clause.15
It has also focused on horizontal separation of powers.16
In the last few decades, the Court is turning its attention to another
area—vertical separation of powers. The Court still decides dormant
commerce clause cases, civil liberties cases, and horizontal separation of
powers cases, of course, but to its menu of cases, it has added a new course,
vertical separation of powers.
Commentators often note that the Court is an anti-democratic institution,
and so it is when it invalidates a law that impinges on, for example, free
speech. In contrast, when the Court is enforcing vertical integration, it is
helping the democratic process. It is also making our union more effective
because it takes advantage of the wisdom of crowds.
The most recent case demonstrating that there are limits to the federal
power over commerce and the federal power to attach conditions to federal
spending is National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.17 Yes,
Sebelius. Granted, the Court (5 to 4) upheld the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act, popularly called Obamacare. However, to reach that
result, the majority engaged in a creative reinterpretation of the statute—
reading the law so that what the statute says is not a tax is really a tax. Later,
the Court reinterpreted the law so that it read “state” to mean “state or
federal”—again, to save the law.18
The Court’s multiple exercises in dramatic statutory reinterpretation
should not mask the significant holding that a clear majority in Sebelius did
embrace. First, the Court held (5 to 4) that Congress does not have the
constitutional power under the Commerce Clause to regulate omissions (the
failure to buy medical insurance) because an omission is not a commercial
act. Omissions are not commerce and an omission is not an act; it is just an
omission, the failure to act. Second, the Court held (6 to 2), for the first time,
that Congress exceeded its power under the Spending Clause. Let us now
analyze each of these holdings.
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THE COMMERCE POWER AFTER SEBELIUS
One can summarize the federal commerce power as follows. Congress
may use its commerce power to regulate:
[1] any instrumentality of interstate commerce (a railroad, an
automobile, a telephone, even if no one crosses a state law);19 or
[2] crossing state line, even if the crossing does not involve a
commercial act;20 or
[3] a commercial act (even an insignificant one) within one state that
affects commerce among other states when that commercial act is
added to other such acts and “taken together with that of many
others similarly situated,” the effect on commerce “is far from
trivial.”21
Applying these tests, in 1995, in United States v. Lopez,22 the Court
invalidated a law as not within the commerce power. This case marked the
first time since 1937 that the Court held that the commerce power could not
justify a federal law. However, the Court did not overrule any cases and
followed the three-prong approach that it has used since 1937.
In Lopez, the federal government prosecuted a person who was merely
holding a gun near a school. Holding a gun is not an instrumentality of
interstate commerce. It is not crossing a state line. It is not a commercial act.
For all the wailing and gnashing of teeth by commentators worried that
the Court was turning back to Lochner,23 all the Lopez Court did was apply

06/27/2016 12:34:37
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19
See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
20
Congress, for example, could forbid an individual from crossing a state line with his paramour.
See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (non-commercialized vice); see also Campion v.
Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (lottery case); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 256.
21
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (“The effect of the statute before us is to
restrict the amount which may be produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall
resort to the market by producing to meet his own needs. That appellee’s own contribution to the demand
for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where,
as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.”);
see also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
22
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
23
Commentators incorrectly predicted that the Court would surely reject the commerce clause
challenge. E.g., Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement
and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1174 n.65 (1995) (“The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Lopez
will likely be reversed because it flies in the face of most Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”); id. at 1210
n.43 (“Ultimately, the Court can be expected to reject this claim [in Lopez].”); Eric W. Hagen, United
States v. Lopez: Artificial Respiration for the Tenth Amendment, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1363, 1392 (1996)
(Lopez gave “artificial respiration” to the Tenth Amendment.); Eric Grossman, Where Do We Go from
Here? The Aftermath and Application of United States v. Lopez, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 795, 854 (1996)
(incorrectly predicting, “it would not be a federal crime for felons in states where firearms are
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manufactured to possess or receive them”) (footnote omitted).
24
Plug in “514 U.S. 549” into Westlaw and you will see a list of hundreds of cases classified as
“negative” treatment of Lopez.
25
402 U.S. 146 (1971).
26
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
27
Id. at 127–28 (“Consumption on the farm where grown appears to vary in an amount greater
than 20 per cent of average production.”).

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 15 Side B

precedent. Search Westlaw and you will find 346 federal cases that treat
Lopez as “negative.”24 One might think that lower federal courts are supposed
to follow Supreme Court precedent, not call it into doubt, or recognize their
disagreement.
Lopez did not overturn any case law. The majority did not argue that gun
violence does not affect commerce. Of course it does. All crimes affect
commerce. The victims of violence seek care in hospitals. They suffer. They
buy medicine instead of ice cream. If there were no crime, that would affect
commerce too. But, possessing a gun near a school is not an “economic
activity.”
Lopez cited with approval other cases with a broad view of the
commerce power. For example, Perez v. United States25 upheld a federal law
that regulated loan sharking. That case, explained Lopez, involved an
economic activity (and an illegal one) that affects commerce in other states.
Even though the economic activity does not cross a state line, it follows the
third prong of the commerce power.
Similarly, Lopez reaffirmed that the federal regulation of the production
of wheat in Wickard v. Filburn26 was a regulation to control the price of
wheat. Price regulation certainly regulates economic activity. Growing wheat
for sale or growing wheat so you do not have to buy it to meet your own
needs is also an economic activity. “That appellee’s own contribution to the
demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from
the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together
with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial,” amounting to
over 20% of all wheat produced.27
Understanding Lopez is not rocket science. If the prohibited activity
does not cross a state line and does not regulate an instrumentality of
interstate commerce, Congress can still regulate if it meets the third prong—
a commercial act (even an insignificant one) within one state that affects
commerce among other states when that commercial act is added to other
acts. Possessing a gun is not a commercial act. Growing wheat for sale (or
growing wheat to avoid having to purchase it) is a commercial act.
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Lopez agreed that there must be some limits
to the commerce power. However, he could not think of any. Granted, he
does insist that the federal government could not regulate “any and all aspects
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[Commerce] is not intended to say that these words comprehend that
commerce, [1] which is completely internal, [2] which is carried on
between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same
State, and [3] which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a
power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.35
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28
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 624 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To hold this statute
constitutional is not . . . to hold that the Commerce Clause permits the Federal Government to . . . regulate
any and all aspects of education.”).
29
514 U.S. 669 (1995) (per curiam).
30
Id. at 671 (emphasis in original).
31
Id. (emphasis in original).
32
Id.
33
22 U.S. 1 (1824).
34
Id. at 194.
35
Id. (emphasis and bracketed numbers added).

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 16 Side A

of education.”28 However, his assertion is a real hoot. The federal government
already regulates many aspects of education—even what schools must serve
in school lunches.
The Court underscored the significance and limited reach of Lopez in
United States v. Robertson,29 which it issued only five days after Lopez.
Robertson affirmed the power of Congress to prohibit investing funds of
unlawful activities in a business (a gold mine) that bought and sold goods
that crossed state lines. It was unnecessary to determine if the gold mine met
the third prong of the commerce clause—the “affects” test. Robertson
explained that the Court uses the affects test “to define the extent of
Congress’ power over purely intrastate commercial activities that
nonetheless have substantial interstate effects.”30 The gold mine obviously
never left the state, but evidence at the Robertson trial showed that the mine
was engaged in “interstate activities.” For example, “Robertson purchased at
least $100,000 worth of equipment and supplies for use in the mine.”31
Whether or not the gold mine was “substantially affecting interstate
commerce,” it purchased supplies and equipment for use in the mine from
interstate commerce, that defendant sought workers for the mine from out of
state, and that defendant took $30,000 worth of gold with him out of state.32
Lopez should not have been a surprise and should not have drawn any
dissents when it said that the affects test requires a “commercial” act. The
mother of all commerce clause cases, Gibbons v. Ogden,33 talked of
“commerce” and “commercial intercourse” more than 100 times. Chief
Justice John Marshall argued that the federal commerce power is very broad.
“Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of
each State, but may be introduced into the interior.”34 Nonetheless, in the
very next sentence he also acknowledged:
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United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
Id. at 566; see also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (interpreting a federal law, 18
U.S.C. § 1202(a), to require the felon transport the gun across state lines).
38
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
39
Id. at 609. The Morrison majority had no problem with another portion of this law, § 40221(a),
which “creates a federal criminal remedy to punish interstate crimes of abuse including crimes committed
against spouses or intimate partners during interstate travel and crimes committed by spouses or intimate
partners who cross State lines to continue the abuse.” S. Rep. No. 103–138, p. 43 (1993). The majority
noted that the courts of appeals “have uniformly upheld this criminal sanction as an appropriate exercise
of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, reasoning that ‘[t]he provision properly falls within the first of
Lopez’s categories as it regulates the use of channels of interstate commerce—i.e., the use of the interstate
transportation routes through which persons and goods move.’” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613, n.5.
40
Id. at 610 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560) (emphasis added).
37
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Gibbons did not authorize Congress to regulate an activity that (1) was
completely within one state and (2) was not commercial.
Lopez applies Gibbons when it held that possessing a gun is not a
commercial act. “The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense
an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially
affect any sort of interstate commerce.”36 The government did not even offer
any evidence that Mr. Lopez had transported the gun across state lines.37
The Court applies the principle of Lopez in United States v. Morrison,38
when it held that rape is not a commercial act and hence Congress cannot
create a federal tort using its commerce clause power. The commerce clause
does not reach “gender-motivated violence.” A rape is a horrible act. It also
affects commerce in the sense that it is a subset of crime and crime affects
commerce. But rape (unlike securities fraud or loan sharking) is not an
economic activity. The federal statute at issue governed “gender-motivated
violence wherever it occurs (rather than violence directed at the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, interstate markets, or things or
persons in interstate commerce),”39 so the question is whether rape is a
commercial activity that substantially affects commerce. It is not.
Congress made findings that gender-motivated violence affects
commerce, and the majority did not dispute that at all. The problem was that
this finding is irrelevant. All violence affects commerce. If all violence
miraculously ended, that miracle also would affect commerce. However,
violence is neither a commercial act nor an economic activity. One cannot
use the “affects” test on non-economic activity because then everything
would be within the commerce power and it would convert the central
government to a government not bound by enumerated powers. Even the
dissent in Lopez and Morrison conceded that the commerce power had to
have limits. “Where economic activity substantially affects interstate
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”40
This case, like Lopez, was five to four, with the same four justices
dissenting—Souter, Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg. The Souter dissent
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Id. at 651 n.19 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ.).
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
Or, as the unanimous Court said in the companion case filed that same day, Katzenbach v. McClung, “Of
course, the mere fact that Congress has said when particular activity shall be deemed to affect commerce
does not preclude further examination by this Court.” 379 U.S. 294, 303 (1964).
43
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
44
See SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS pt. II (1st pt.), question 71, art. 5 (Fathers
of the English Dominican Province trans., 2d rev. ed. 1920) (1265–1274) (“Does every sin include
action?”).
45
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 3 (350 B.C.E).
42
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(joined by the other dissenters) is self-contradictory. It says that politics and
the ballot box do not define the commerce power. A few sentences later, it
says that the limits on the federal commerce power “should be a political
choice and only a political choice.”41 One of the nice things about being on
the Supreme Court (besides no heavy lifting and indoor work) is that you can
make self-contradictory statements with gay abandon because there is no
appeal (except to the law reviews).
Perhaps the Souter dissent did not realize that the Court has always
rejected the idea that the reach of the commerce power is a “political choice
and only a political choice.” Even after 1937, when the Court abdicated a role
in deciding economic policy, the Court still made clear that it decides if an
act is within the commerce power. As Justice Black pithily explained,
“Whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to
come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is
ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled
finally only by this Court.”42
That brings us to National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius.43 Recall that Lopez and Morrison already told us that Congress
cannot use the “affects” prong of the commerce clause to regulate what is not
an instrumentality of interstate commerce or does not cross a state line unless
there is a (1) commercial (2) act that affects commerce. Holding a gun or
sexually assaulting someone is not a commercial act. Not buying insurance
is not a commercial act. It is not even an act. It is an omission.
Thomas Aquinas figured out over 700 years ago that acts are different
from omissions.44 Aristotle articulated that distinction over 1,600 years
before Aquinas.45 Chief Justice Roberts in his separate opinion, and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito in their joint dissent all agree that
Congress cannot use the commerce power to force people to enter into
commerce, i.e., buy health insurance or buy medical care. Sebelius tells us
that Congress also cannot use the affects prong to force people to enter into
commerce. Not buying insurance is not a commercial act. It is an omission.
Congress cannot force people to buy things, even though the decision to
buy (or a decision not to buy) affects commerce. If Congress could regulate
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46
“The Government argues that the individual mandate can be sustained as a sort of exception to
this rule, because health insurance is a unique product.” Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (emphasis added).
47
“As several times noted, the unique attributes of the health-care market render everyone active
in that market and give rise to a significant free-riding problem that does not occur in other markets.” Id.
at 2623 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 17 Side B

omissions that affect commerce, it can regulate everything and there would
be no limits to the commerce power. Yet, the Court has said repeatedly and
consistently that there are limits to the commerce power. Congress cannot
regulate under the commerce power by claiming that an omission is an act.
Another way of looking at Sebelius is to understand that the Court
agreed that the failure to buy insurance, like any failure to purchase
something, affects commerce. If I rip my trousers and therefore have to go to
the tailor to fix them or go to the store to buy another pair of trousers, I am
affecting commerce. Failing to rip my trousers also affects commerce
because it means I will not repair or replace them. All acts (or failures to act)
affect commerce. However, all the prior case law requires—under the
“affects” prong of the commerce clause—is something that is (1) commercial
and is (2) an activity. Failing to act is not an activity.
The Solicitor General tried to distinguish these commerce cases by
arguing that failure to buy medical insurance is “unique,”46 because it is
something we all will eventually use. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent (joined by
Justices Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor) also argued that health insurance is
“unique.”47
That argument, like a fly in your soup, is a little hard to swallow. There
is nothing unique about medical care. What is true of medical care is also true
of coffins. Eventually we will all need a coffin or some other way of
disposing of our bodies. Can the government force us, now, to buy coffins or
urns for ashes because none of us will be able to prevent the inevitable? At
some point we will all be in the market for disposing of our mortal remains.
Similarly, we all eventually buy food and transportation. Could the
government require us to buy a new car or bus tokens because those
purchases (or refusal to purchase) will also affect commerce? The majority
says no, although the failure to buy food, or cars, or bus tokens also affects
commerce. The response of the dissent—health is “unique.”
We should always be wary whenever a judge says that the rule in a case
is “unique.” That means that the judge cannot distinguish the case from other
situations but does not want to apply the precedent to the other situations.
Precedent is the lifeblood of the Court. Precedent binds the Court and limits
what would otherwise be the almost limitless power of the Justices. Judges
who find even this modest limit too confining respond by saying that the case
is “unique.”
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Five Justices agree that Congress cannot use the commerce power to
force people to enter into commerce (the “individual mandate”), to regulate
omissions, or to regulate a noncommercial act. One might argue that there is
no holding on this point because Roberts did not join the joint dissent (Scalia,
Kennedy, and Alito label their joint opinion a “dissent”). In addition, the joint
dissent did not join any of the Roberts opinion. Even if one were to accept
that argument, there still is a clear holding on this issue. Part III(C) of Chief
Justice Roberts’ opinion is an opinion of the Court—not merely the
comments of a plurality. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan
all join part II(C), where Roberts says:
The Court today holds that our Constitution protects us from federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause so long as we abstain from the
regulated activity. But from its creation, the Constitution has made no
such promise with respect to taxes.48
All nine Justices agree with the first sentence of that quotation. First,
four justices join Roberts in part III(C), so we have a holding. That may seem
a little hard to believe after reading the Ginsburg dissent, but she, along with
and Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor join part III(C) and the crucial sentence
is right there, in part III(C). The four dissenters also agree in their separate
dissent on this point. Granted, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito could
have labeled their opinion more accurately as “concurring in part and
dissenting in part,” but they all agree with Roberts and the other four—“our
Constitution protects us from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause
so long as we abstain from the regulated activity.”

Sebelius recognized and applied another significant limit to federal
power—the Spending Clause. The Court limited federal power to bribe the
states by taxing the taxpayers within each state and then telling the states that
they must accept federal rules or the federal government will continue to tax
the states’ taxpayers but then give that money to other states. The Court has
always said that there are limits to the federal spending power,49 but it has
never found one before this case.
Sebelius held that Congress can put certain strings on its expenditure of
federal funds. This rule reflects the old adage, “He who pays the piper can
call the tune.” Congress can use the money it raises through taxes or the
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2599 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”); see
also 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 5.7 (5th ed. 2012).
49
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money it borrows to bribe the states. When Congress fashions its bribe, it can
tell a state, “Here is federal money to create a health care program subject to
various restrictions. If you do not create the program and accept the
restrictions, then you cannot have the money.” Congress can also tell the
states, “If you do not accept various modifications to the federal program you
are already implementing, Congress will take away the money for that
program.”
What Congress cannot do is tell a state, “You must accept a new and
substantially different program, or we will take away the money we have
given you for another program.” Seven of the Justices embraced that
principle in Sebelius. Hence, Congress could not take away all the funding
for Medicaid if a state refused to accept this new program. Congress was
imposing “a shift in kind, not merely degrees,” said Chief Justice Roberts, in
a portion of the opinion that Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.50 Forcing
states either to accept an entirely new program or lose the largest single
source of funds in the state budget is putting a “gun to the head” of the
states.51
Roberts acknowledged that Congress could repeal the old Medicaid
statute and then pass a new health care law that included all the provisions
of the old Medicaid law plus the new Obamacare/ACA provisions. Then,
states would lose everything (100% loss of all federal funds for all health care
aid) if they did not accept the expanded coverage. That spending law would
not be coercive, because there was no bait and switch. However, what
Congress could do in theory it would not do in practice: if Congress repealed
Medicaid, Congress would be inviting all of its members to rethink Medicaid
from scratch.52
See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06.
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The Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree. The original
program was designed to cover medical services for four particular categories of the needy: the
disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent children. Previous amendments
to Medicaid eligibility merely altered and expanded the boundaries of these categories. Under the
Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program to meet the health care needs of the
entire nonelderly population with income below 133% of the poverty level. It is no longer a program
to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide
universal health insurance coverage.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted).
51
Id. at 2604.
52
Id. at 2566, 2606 n.14 (citations omitted) (“Justice Ginsburg suggests that the States can have
no objection to the Medicaid expansion, because ‘Congress could have repealed Medicaid [and,]
[t]hereafter, . . . could have enacted Medicaid II, a new program combining the pre–2010 coverage with
the expanded coverage required by the ACA.’ But it would certainly not be that easy. Practical constraints
would plainly inhibit, if not preclude, the Federal Government from repealing the existing program and
putting every feature of Medicaid on the table for political reconsideration. Such a massive undertaking
would hardly be ‘ritualistic.’ The same is true of Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion that Congress could
establish Medicaid as an ‘exclusively federal program.’”).
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Justice Ginsburg and Sotomayor argued that the states knew that if they
accepted the original Medicaid program that Congress could change it.
Ginsburg reasoned that “Future Congresses are not bound by their
predecessors’ dispositions; they have authority to spend federal revenue as
they see fit.”53 Of course, one can say exactly the same thing about state
legislatures. Prior state legislatures do not bind later ones. Ginsburg never got
around to answering that response.
The joint dissent agreed that this federal spending condition was
“coercive,”54 although the joint dissent differed on whether the remedy is to
strike the entire law because this provision was not severable.55 The Roberts
majority found a way to invalidate only part of the spending restriction, in a
way that does look like the Court is amending the law.
In short, Congress cannot use its spending power to order states to
accept the expanded federal coverage aid or suffer the loss of all funds in a
substantially different program, the original Medicaid program.56
THE WISDOM OF CROWDS AND THE ROLE OF THE STATES
Separation of Powers—both vertically and horizontally—reflects a
scientific principle, Newtonian mechanics: for every action there is an equal
and opposite reaction. Vertical separation also reflects another principle from
economics, the wisdom of crowds. This principle goes back to Adam Smith,
author of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759),57 and An Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776).58
In his first book, Smith analyzed the role the great mass of people in
deciding how to organize society in a very efficient way, without any order
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[T]he offer that the ACA makes to the States—go along with a dramatic expansion of Medicaid or
potentially lose all federal Medicaid funding—is quite unlike anything that we have seen in a prior
spending-power case. In South Dakota v. Dole, the total amount that the States would have lost if
every single State had refused to comply with the 21–year–old drinking age was approximately
$614.7 million—or about 0.19% of all state expenditures combined. . . . Under the ACA, by contrast,
the Federal Government has threatened to withhold 42.3% of all federal outlays to the states, or
approximately $233 billion.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2664 (citations omitted).
55
Id. at 2667.
56 The vote was seven to two on this spending clause issue, with Breyer and Kagan joining
Roberts, and the four dissenters (Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito).
57
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1789).
58
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1776).
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53
Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Future Congresses are not bound by their predecessors’
dispositions; they have authority to spend federal revenue as they see fit. The Federal Government,
therefore, is not, as The Chief Justice charges, threatening States with the loss of ‘existing’ funds from
one spending program in order to induce them to opt into another program.”).
54 As the joint dissent noted,
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imposed from on high. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he said (nearly
two decades before The Wealth of Nations) that people act individually as if
guided by an invisible hand.59 His later book, which he published on March
9, 1776, a few months before our Declaration of Independence, elaborates on
this principle. One should consider both books together, as Smith intended.
Over two centuries later, Nobel Laureate economist Frederick Hayek
(trained as a lawyer) elaborated on this principle basic to Adam Smith––the
wisdom of crowds. Hayek called it in his book a “fatal conceit.”60 The conceit
of some people is that they know best how to shape the world around them
according to their wishes. Hayek drew his title from a principle articulated in
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.61
The framers intended for states to have certain powers that the federal
government could not override. The federal government cannot and should
not decide every issue and impose its “one size fits all” solution on all of the
states. States have an important role to play, because our fifty states share
some of the characteristics of a crowd of fifty, and the crowd knows better
than the central government.
Many politicians and others are confident they know what must be done
and do not like the restrictions that our Constitution imposes on doing what
they know should be done. In 2011, for example, Beverly Perdue, thenGovernor of North Carolina, seriously proposed suspending elections to
Congress “for two years,” so Congress can enact laws to spur the economy
without worrying about elections.62 After the inevitable criticism, she
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The man of system, on the contrary, is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is often so
enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the
smallest deviation from any part of it. He goes on to establish it completely and in all its parts,
without any regard either to the great interests, or to the strong prejudices which may oppose it. He
seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as
the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces upon
the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them;
but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of
its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it. If those
two principles coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human society will go on easily
and harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy and successful. If they are opposite or different,
the game will go on miserably, and the society must be at all times in the highest degree of disorder.
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS pt. VI, sec. II, ch. II, ¶ 42 (1759) (emphasis added).
62
North Carolina Governor Suggests Suspending Elections to Spur Economic Solutions, FOX
NEWS (Sept. 27, 2011), www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/27/north-carolina-governor-suggests-suspen
ding-elections-to-spur-economic.html.
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59 “They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of
life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants,
and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to
the multiplication of the species.” ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS pt. IV, ch. I, ¶ 10
(1789).
60
F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1989).
61
Hayek drew his title from Adam Smith, who said:
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Matthew Boyle, New Audio: NC Governor Struck Serious Tone on Suspending Congressional
Elections, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 28, 2011, 11:26 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/28/new-audio-ncgovernor-struck-serious-tone-on-suspending-congressional-elections.
64
Louis Michael Seidman, Let’s Give Up on the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2012),
www.nytimes.com/2012/12/31/opinion/lets-give-up-on-the-constitution.html?_r=0. Lest one think that he
was not making well-thought-out remarks, he amplifies the claim in his book, LOUIS SEIDMAN, ON
CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012). See, for example, id. at 12, where he criticizes those who
“insist” that we follow the commands of people “who are not even biologically related to most of us.”
One wonders if the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 binds me. The people who enacted that are a bunch of
dead white males, not biologically related to Seidman or me. I have no kinship with the people who
enacted the Affordable Care Act, popularly called Obamacare, but the law still binds me (I know that
because I discovered that I cannot keep my health plan and my doctor. Oh, well.).
65
I say “about” because the District of Columbia is the 51st jurisdiction with home rule powers.
Similarly, there are U.S. territories, such as Guam, the Northern Marianas Islands, Puerto Rico, American
Samoa, and the Virgin Islands. All these territories have some home rule powers.
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suggested she was joking, but the videos of her remarks do not support that
interpretation.63 She sounded deadly serious and no one in the crowd laughed.
Hubris is not limited to politicians. Louis Seidman, a law professor at
Georgetown University, thinks that our nation “teeters at the edge of fiscal
chaos” and “the culprit” is “our insistence on obedience to the Constitution,
with all its archaic, idiosyncratic and downright evil provisions.”64 Such
people suffer from a fatal conceit—that they know better than any of us what
is good for us and if we do not understand that, then these “wise” people
should impose their will on us.
That economic principle of the wisdom of crowds explains why vertical
separation not only helps to preserve our liberties but also to make our
government better and more reflective of the wisdom of the people. The
existence of the states does not mean that the government will enact laws or
execute policy more quickly. It does mean that the states are more likely, over
time, to enact laws that are better than the laws that the federal government
imposes from on high. One size seldom fits all.
If we compare each state to a person, the states are like a small crowd
of about fifty.65 The crowd, as a group, is smarter than the smartest person in
the crowd is. When states have rights and powers, the nation as a whole is
better off. States’ rights serve to protect our liberties and make government
work in a better way. The collective wisdom of the fifty states is better than
one person’s wisdom, even if that person is an expert.
A fundamental postulate of democracy is that the people, overall, are
more likely to be correct than a benevolent dictator or oligarchy. The
collective wisdom is better than one person’s wisdom, even if that person is
an expert. A larger group of people is more likely to come to a better solution
than a smaller.
For example, the TV studio audience of Who Wants to Be a Millionaire
guessed correctly 91% of the time, while the “experts” guessed only 65%
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66
JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE
FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND NATIONS 3–4
(2005).
67
The herd mentality accompanies bull markets that end in bubbles and the beginning of major
declines. We tend to do what others do, but only those who do not follow the herd are the ones to make
the real money. We all know that we should buy low and sell high, but it is much easier to buy when
everyone else is buying enthusiastically and much harder to buy when doom and gloom abound. Economic
empirical studies also bear out this fact that we tend to create bubbles in the stock market when we think
we are smarter than others are, for then we follow the “greater fool” theory—we just follow others rather
than adding to the wisdom of the group. Vernon L. Smith, Gerry L. Suchanek & Arlington W. Williams,
Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets, 56 ECONOMETRICA
1119 (1988); see also SUROWIECKI, supra note 66, at 249–51 (discussing experiments). When we think
the “smart money” is buying, then we buy. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 158 (2d ed.
2005). When people panic and sell, we sell. It is easier to buy high, when optimism abounds, and sell low,
when pessimism is the order of the day, than to do the opposite.
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correctly.66 Sir Francis Galton, a nineteenth century polymath and
statistician, marveled at what he saw at a 1906 country fair. Eight hundred
people participated in a contest to guess the weight of an ox, slaughtered and
dressed. Their median guess of 1207 pounds was within 1% of the true weight
of 1198 pounds. Empirical studies show that groups are often smarter than
the smartest people who are in them.
Democracies make, overall, better decisions. That is why, in the twentyfirst century, democracies are on the top of the food chain. People strive to
enter democracies while trying to escape dictatorships. More North Koreans
seek to go to South Korea than vice versa. Ditto for East and West Germany.
The crowd has wisdom when there is a diversity of opinion within the
crowd, the people act independently of each other, they are decentralized—
that is, people give their own opinion rather than follow the cue of someone
else (each of the people who guessed the weight of the ox made his own
decision). If they do not act independently, they act like a herd.67
When we think of democracy, nowadays, we think of majority rule
subject to individual rights and liberties. We often call this “liberal
democracy,” which has nothing to do with liberals or conservatives.
Dictatorship by the people is mob rule. Plebiscites, historically, are the tools
of dictators, not of democracies. Individual rights, such as free speech, free
exercise of religion, reduce the danger of slipping into dictatorship and acting
like the herd. This is how we control, in democracy, what we would call
“bubbles” if we were talking about the stock market.
If we are searching for the best form of government, we have found a
solution and it is liberal democracy. Democracy does not seem on the march
today, with the dictatorships in Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and so
forth. Yet, like investors, we should look at the long range, not the short
range. In 1974, there were only thirty-five electoral democracies in the world,
representing less than a third of the countries. By 2013, there were more
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68
Francis Fukuyama, At the “End of History” Still Stands Democracy, WALL ST. J. (June 6, 2014,
2:52 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/at-the-end-of-history-still-stands-democracy-1402080661.
69
Danielle Wiener-Bronner, Yes, There Are Elections in North Korea and Here’s How They
Work, THE WIRE (Mar. 6, 2014, 11:59 AM), www.thewire.com/global/2014/03/north-korea-electionsguide/358875.
70
Adam Withnall, North Korea Elections: Kim Jong-un Wins 100% of the Vote, INDEPENDENT
(Mar. 10, 2014), www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kim-jongun-wins-100-of-the-vote-in-northkorean-elections-9180814.html.
71
Larry Diamond, Francis Fukuyama & Stephen Krasner, Mongolia’s Next Challenge: The
Country Has Come Far, But Should Now Turn to Combating Corruption, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2012,
12:58 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444358804578015933209631870.
72
Fukuyama, supra note 68.
73
The economic sanctions against Russia because of Ukraine have hurt, at least a bit. Over time,
they will hurt more. Putin responded by preventing the import of certain goods from the West. When there
is a war, the first thing one country does is block goods from the adversary. Putin put a blockade around
his own country. He did to his country what an adversary would do to it in time of war!
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countries (thanks in part to the break-up of the Soviet Union), and over 60%
of them—120—were democracies.68
Admittedly, Russia has become a dictatorship without an ideology.
However, Putin runs for election and claims the people freely elected him.
Ditto for the sham elections in Venezuela, Iran, North Korea,69 and other
places. Even the absolute dictators like Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un hold
elections. He won with 100% of the North Korean vote in March 2014.70
Dictators pay lip service to democracy because hypocrisy is the tribute that
vice pays to virtue. That is why Putin pretended that the people of Crimea
freely voted for Russian annexation.
Over time, democracies will take over the world. We reached the tipping
point in 2013, when 60% of the countries were real democracies and almost
all the rest pretend to be. Consider for example, Mongolia, situated between
Russia and China. Since 1991, Freedom House has consistently declared
Mongolia a “free” country. Political parties rotate in and out of power,
without the shedding of blood or mass demonstrations.71 Mongolia, not
Turkey, is the harbinger of what is to come.
Democracies do not have the same control over the economy as
dictatorships. We have more free trade today than we had a half-century
earlier. Market-based economies and democracy are linked. Francis
Fukuyama noted, “Democracy has always rested on a broad middle class, and
the ranks of prosperous, property-holding citizens have ballooned
everywhere in the past generation.”72 The break-up of the Soviet Union and
the opening up of Russia and China, each with their own stock markets, will
be as dramatic as discovering the new world in 1492. That prosperity makes
the whole world more prosperous because of trade. Mutual trade leads to
interdependence and interdependence leads to peace.73 That is important for
many reasons. In modern times, no democracy has gone to war against
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another. Democracy leads to peace.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of what we often call “states’ rights” is not to protect the
rights of states. It is to protect us. It protects our freedom by dividing power
and making it more difficult for government to act. Unfortunately, Congress
has steadily encroached on the power of the states by treating the commerce
clause and the spending clause as having no limits. We may well be just one
justice away from the Court overturning the rather modest limits imposed by
Lopez, Morrison, and Sebelius. Recall that they all garnered strong dissents
and the dissenters keep on dissenting.
Congress and the Court should know better. As Justice O’Connor
reminded us:
The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the
benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities,
or even for the benefit of the public officials governing the States. To
the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state
governments for the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not
just an end in itself: “Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties
that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”74
Vertical separation allows the people to pursue local policies “more sensitive
to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society,” to permit “innovation and
experimentation,” and to make government “more responsive by putting the
States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”75
Or, as Justice Kennedy reminded us in a later case:

Federalism also protects the liberty of all persons within a State by
ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental power
cannot direct or control their actions. By denying any one government
complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism
protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power. When
government acts in excess of its lawful powers, that liberty is at stake.76
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74
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.)).
75
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
76
See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221–22 (2011).
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Federalism secures the freedom of the individual. It allows States to
respond, through the enactment of positive law, to the initiative of those
who seek a voice in shaping the destiny of their own times without
having to rely solely upon the political processes that control a remote
central power. . . .
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77
The most recent polls show that only 43% of likely U.S. voters have a favorable opinion of the
health care law, and less than a fifth has a “very favorable” opinion of it. 54% view the law unfavorably,
including 37% who regard it “very unfavorably.” Voters Are Still Down on Obamacare, RASMUSSEN
REPORTS (Mar. 3, 2016), www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/archive/health_care_update_archive/
voters_are_still_down_on_obamacare.
78
In October of 2014, polls showed that 53% viewed the Affordable Care Act unfavorably, a
jump of eight percentage points. Jeffrey Young, Obamacare Is More Unpopular than Ever, Poll Shows,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2014, 4:59 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/01/obamacare-poll_n_
5639192.html. Another poll, in February 2015, concluded, “voters are less supportive of governmentimposed levels of health insurance.” In addition, “[m]ost think consumers are better off with less
government involvement in the health care marketplace.” Voters Are Less Supportive of GovernmentImposed Levels of Health Insurance, RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Feb. 2, 2015), www.rasmussenreports.
com/public_content/archive/health_care_update_archive/february_2015/voters_are_less_supportive_of_
government_imposed_levels_of_health_insurance.
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We are one Justice away from treating this principle of federalism as a
quaint aphorism from a bygone era.
When we forget these lessons, we take a path that restricts our liberties
while enacting policies that do not reflect the wisdom of crowds. What is true
of the wisdom of crowds as applied to democracy is true of the wisdom of
crowds as applied to the fifty states.
Let us consider one recent example—Obamacare. Congress could have
repealed federal laws that prohibit interstate competition in medical
insurance and repeal other laws so that the federal government would get out
of the way of states experimenting with health insurance.
Then, the people in each of states could have created their own medical
insurance program to fit their local needs. If the people of one state wanted
broad coverage, they could enact it. If the people in another state wanted to
cover only catastrophic care, they could do that. If a state favored “singlepayer” health insurance, it could do that. The states would not have to worry
about commerce clause restrictions and the individual mandate, because they
do not rely on the enumerated powers of Congress to enact laws.
If, over time, we would learn that the system in State No. 1 is better than
State No. 2, the second state can copy the first. Imitation is the sincerest form
of flattery. We are just as likely to learn that there is no system that is best,
or that what the people in one state think is best is not what the people in
other state prefer.
Instead, we have a law so massive and complicated that no one was able
to read it before its enactment. Congress drafted the law so poorly that the
Court has engaged in interpretive contortions in order to rewrite and thereby
save it. Congress enacted all prior social welfare laws, Social Security,
Medicare, and Medicaid, with bipartisan support. Obamacare did not attract
a single Republican vote. Obamacare was unpopular when Congress enacted
it and it remains unpopular today.77 In fact, the more people learn about
Obamacare, the more unfavorable they are towards it.78
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Then there is the untidy little fact that the politicians lied to us in order
to secure the necessary votes. By “lie” I do not mean they made a mistake. I
do not mean that they were a little negligent in investigating the issues. I
mean they knew one thing and told us another; they intentionally told us
falsehoods.
Remember when the President told us (at least thirty-six times) that if
you like your doctor and plan, you can keep it?79 We know now that the
politicians knew that was false when they told us.80
Remember when they told us that there was no tax? They lied about that
too.81
Remember when they told us that, like the miracle of the loaves and
fishes, the federal government would give us universal health care and it
would cost less?82 They lied about that too. We know that from emails that
the federal courts are forcing the State Department to release. While the
architects of Obamacare were telling us that the new law would save us
money, they were emailing Hillary Clinton and telling her that all that was
not true.83
One of the buzzwords of today is “diversity.” How ironic is it that while
we purport to favor diversity we reject diversity when it comes to the states.
Instead, we have national uniformity. Instead of listening to the wisdom of
the framers, we travel down a path that restricts our freedom and while
rejecting experimentation, variety, and the wisdom of the crowd. Politicians
who lie to voters are not only rejecting the wisdom of the crowds, they are
rejecting the fundamental postulate of democracy.
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